In wireless ad hoc networks environment, Bellovin and Merritt first developed a password-based Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol against offline dictionary attacks using both symmetric and public-key cryptography independent of the public key infrastructure (PKI) 
Introduction
Wireless ad hoc networks are self-organized networks that can be rapidly deployed for a special purpose in situations where no infrastructure exists. In an open wireless medium, the ad hoc nodes are low-cost, resource-constrained, and limited in computation thus being more vulnerable to physical security threats [21, 22] (such as eavesdropping, relaying, etc) than wire line networks. So, establishing secure communication among the two participating entities is of typical defense against man-in-middle attack. That means a secret key, called a session key which is later used to construct a confidential session, is dynamically and randomly established over public insecure channel and each participating entity identifies that the session key is derived from the authentic instead of an imposter.
Considering a node in an ad hoc network is usually portable device such as a laptop or a PDA which is hold by people and a user enters his password in his memory to access the device, the session key is exchanged confidentially using a shared perfect password, which must fulfill three random properties: (1) it is impossible to randomly generate the same sequence; (2) any character in sequence is independent of previous one and no other information is provided for speculating about the whole sequence; (3) any character in sequence is distributed with equal probability. However, for the convenience of people's memory for password, the sequence of password picked by people is so small and regular that it is difficult to achieve perfect randomness, thus being often vulnerable to dictionary attack [3] in practice. The first attempt to protect a password protocol against offline dictionary attacks was made by Bellovin and Merritt [1] who presented a password-based key agreement protocol that allows two participating entities sharing a secret password to engage in the authentication protocol constructed using both symmetric and public-key cryptography, independent of TTP (trusted third parties) authentication, thus adapting to Ad Hoc networks. But EKE protocol exists the risk that public key is counterfeited by attacker resulting from the shared password cracked by brute-force search, finally the verification of public key is also dependent on the public key infrastructure (PKI), which incurs a high cost. Considering the disadvantage of asymmetric key encryption, Steiner et al. [17] proposed the first password-based three-party encrypted key exchange protocol (3PEKE) in which a online TTP exists to allow mutual authentication between two communication parties without asymmetric encryption algorithm which is adopted to reduce the costs. Later a number of schemes [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16] extend EKE protocol to a multi-party version, but mutual authentication provided by these protocol is dependent of TTP which are unsuitable for wireless Ad Hoc networks, because the TTP may be out of reach or unavailable to some of the nodes resulting from communication range limitations, network dynamics and lack of a prior deployment knowledge. Asokan and Ginzboorg [2] proposed a multi-party password-based key agreement protocol independent of TTP authentication using Diffie-Hellman encrypted key exchange [18] , but it is vulnerable to man-in-middle attacks.
Although the basic EKE protocol and variants provided various advantages such as mutual authentication among participating entities and immunity to the dictionary attack, we discover another implicit weakness in EKE protocol that is vulnerable to imposter attack from the exterior or interior based on the secure analysis of BAN logic [9] that we apply in the pure EKE protocol. Moreover, we find EKE protocol is vulnerable to imposter attack from interior if the shared password is guessed by the attacker using dictionary search.
To remedy the flaws mentioned above, we propose an improved scheme-Provable PasswordAuthenticated Key Exchange (PPAKE) protocol that generates the timestamp for revoking the out-ofdated session key, and verifies the authenticity of public key without TTP. Then the proposed scheme is proven to be secure in mutually authentication by BAN logic analysis. Furthermore our protocol can ensure efficient computations cost suitable for wireless ad hoc networks.
In the rest of the paper is organized as follow: in section 2, the basic EKE protocol is reviewed; in section 3, based the analysis result of BAN logic, secure weakness and redundancy are revealed in EKE protocol; in section 4, a Provable Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PPAKE) protocol is proposed; in section 5, PPAKE protocol is formalized and analyzed by models of BAN logic; in section 6, the safety and computation efficiency of proposed protocol is compared with existing protocol; finally, in section 7, the conclusion of this paper is drawn.
Review of the basic EKE protocol
In this section we review the basic EKE protocol proposed by Bellovin and Merritt. EKE protocol works in the scenario of the secure conference among people with laptop computers, e.g. one participating entity Alice (A) wants to securely communicate with another participating entity Bob (B). First of all, A needs to dynamically establish an authenticated session key K AB with B. As is shown in Fig. 1 , the basic EKE protocol operates as follow, where assuming that a secret password K pwd is preshared between A and B (e.g. A hands her password to B face to face prior to group conference). It is necessary to explain that the encryption in step1 aims to confidentially distribute public key E A to a legitimate node instead of a malice, through a peer-to-peer channel (Alice-Bob channel) independent of public key verification provided by PKI, the processes in step2 to 3 involve exchange of session key and the processes in step4 to 6 convince the receiver A that K AB is transmitted by an authentic originator B instead of an impostor, and convince the transmitter B that K AB has been receipted by an authentic receiver A instead of an impostor using challenge-response approaches.
Security analysis of EKE protocol

Analyzing EKE protocol using BAN logic
Formal methods can be used to examine the weakness and redundancy in cryptographic protocols. The first momentous result is BAN logic which defines semantics [9] shown in Table  I The expected goal of the EKE protocol is to securely pass K AB generated by B to A. Furthermore, A confirms the received K AB is transmitted by B and B confirms the transmitted K AB is obtained by A; they are formalized as following formulas according to the syntax of BAN logic:
Formalized analysis commences with M 1 . After B receives M 1 , formula (1) can be yielded by applying message-meaning rule about shared keys to the initial assumption P 6 . Then formula (2) is yielded by apply nonce-verification rule to P 2 and formula (1). Finally formula (3) is yielded by applying jurisdiction rule to P 1 and formula (2).
After A receives M 2 , formula (4) can be derived from applying the first result of belief rule to P 3 and P 5 . Then formula (5) is yielded by apply message-meaning rule to formula (4) . Finally the goal G 2 is yielded by applying nonce-verification rule to formula (5) and P 12 , furthermore the goal G 1 is easy to achieve by applying jurisdiction rule to P 4 and G 2.
After B receives M 3 , formula (6) and formula (7) can be deduced from applying message-meaning rule about shared keys to P 6 and applying freshness rule to P 11 , respectively. Then formula (8) is yielded by applying nonce-verification rule to formula (6) and formula (7) . Finally the goal G 3 is yielded by applying the third result of belief rule to formula (8) .
After A receives M 4 , formula (9) can be derived from applying message-meaning rule to the achieved goal G 1 , and formula (10) is yielded by applying freshness rule to P 11 . Then formula (11) is yielded by applying nonce-verification rule to formula (9) and formula (10) . Finally the same goal G 2 as receiving M 2 is yielded by applying the third result of belief rule to formula (11) .
After B receives M 5 , the same goal G 3 as receiving M 3 is achieved by the analysis similar to that of M 3 .
The vulnerabilities to imposter attacks from the exterior
Alice Bob
Relay attacks on EKE protocol from the exterior An external attacker is excluded from ad hoc network, and has no legal identity to perform protocol except for counterfeiting legal user through relaying and cracking the captured message using bruteforce search.
According to the result of formula (3), the authentic of E A is verified by B under the assumption that K pwd is secret between A and B. But in practice K pwd is vulnerable to be guessed by the attacker using dictionary attack, thus E A is vulnerable to counterfeit resulting in unreasonable P 1 . As is depicted in Fig.  2 , one attacker Eve eavesdrops M 1 between A and B. Subsequently, E decrypts it with the guessed K pwd to get E A , which is replaced by his public key E E . Then E encrypts E E with K pwd to ' 1 M and disguises himself as A to relay ' 1 M to B. After B receives ' 1 M , formula (12) can be yielded by applying message-
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Volume 4, Number 8, November 2010 meaning rule to the initial assumption P 6 . Then we apply nonce-verification rule to P 2 and formula (12) for yielding formula (13) . Finally formula (14) is yielded by applying jurisdiction rule to P 1 formula (13) . That means B believes E E is a -good‖ one, because BAN logic only considers key distribution and identity authentication regardless of the leakage of key, viz., the key confidentiality is beyond the scope of BAN logic. Then B decrypts it to get E E and generates a K AB , which is encrypted to M 2 with E E and K pwd and sent to A. E captures M 2 and decrypts M 2 with D E and K pwd to obtain K AB , which is encrypted to ' 2 M with E A and K pwd , and E disguises himself as B to relay ' 2 M to A. As a result, K AB is leaked to the attacker, thus communication content between A and B is decrypted by the attacker with K AB.
Moreover, according to the result analysis of protocol, the key exchange and the mutual authentication are achieved under the assumption that P 12 have to be met, viz., the received session key K AB is freshly generated by B in current session. However, the message exchanged is captured and relayed because the transmission medium in ad hoc networks is open, thus the attacker relays the old K AB in previous round to current round resulting in unreasonable P 12 .
For example, one can eavesdrop the previous round's M 2 , which avails him to offline guess an old K AB packaged in it in little time, because the way for the session key to defend against brute-force crack differs from the fixed key. For the fixed keys, such as E A and K pwd , which are initialized to the random sequences with sufficient length, it is impossible to crack them in little time. While the security protection of the session key relies on one -off availability and frequent updating, which are efficiently kept at the price of adopting smaller length and more weak random property of the session key than that of the fixed key, therefore though the session key captured in previous rounds is more vulnerable to crack in sufficient time, it becomes invalid in current rounds if it has been revoked by updated one. Unfortunately, in step2 the attacker discovers that the previous M 2 is still invalid in current rounds, and then he relays the old M 2 that seems like a fresh one to A in the second round of message run. Finally the authenticity of A and B is easy to be verified by B and A using challenge-response messages encrypted with the old K AB , and neither A nor B is aware that the session key is out-of-dated and has been cracked by attacker. Therefore the cracked K AB is regarded as a legal one to establish secure communication between A and B, thus communication content is decrypted by E with the old K AB . In an internal attack, an attacker belongs to a legal participant who owns legal identity to perform protocol. As is depicted in Fig. 3 , if the shared password K pwd is guessed, a legal node Eve launches an imposter attack, which includes two times operation of protocol simultaneously. Firstly, A wants to establish a legal session with E. she sends 1 1 M to E In the first round of message run between A and E, after E receives it, he decrypts 1 1 M with AE pwd K to obtain E A . Subsequently, E disguises himself as A to establish a session with B in different two ways. The first way is depicted in Fig. 3(a) , E A is replaced by E E which is encrypted with AB pwd K and sent together with ID A (original ID E is replaced by ID A for deceiving B) to B in the first round between E and B. After B receives 2 1 M , he decrypts it with AB pwd K to get E A and generates K AB , which is encrypted to 2 2 M and sent to fake A (E) in the second round between B and E. After E receives 2 2 M , he decrypts it with AB pwd K and D A to get K AB , which is encrypted with AE pwd K and E A to 1 2 M and sent to A in the second round between A and E. In subsequent phases, E disguises himself as A to pass the verification of B through forwarding 1 3 M , 1 4 M and 1 5 M . Another way is depicted in Fig. 3(b) , if B can verify the correctness of E A using PKI, E A remains intact to be encrypted with AB pwd K to 2 1 M which is sent together with ID A to B in the first round between E and B. After B receives 2 1 M , he decrypts it with AB pwd K to get E A and generates K AB , which is encrypted to 2 2 M and sent to fake A (E) in the second round between B and E. After E receives 2 2 M , he can counterfeit neither E A nor N A because he doesn't know K AB . In order to exactly respond B, E decrypts generates N A , which is encrypted to 1 3 M with K AB and sent to E in the third round between A and E.
The vulnerabilities to imposter attacks from the interior
Now E acquires what he expects- 1 3 M , which is relayed by E to B. In this way, E disguises himself as A to pass the verification of B through forwarding challenge-response 4 M and 5 M in the subsequent rounds of message run. The core of success attack is that A unconsciously generates the legal challenge-response for E, while A always believe she herself contacts with -good‖ one-E, who unexpectedly imposes on A to deceive B.
As a result, E establishes two sessions (only one in A and B's eyes) simultaneously, one is a legal session established with A, and another is that E disguises himself as A to establish a malicious session with B. But in practice neither A nor B communicates directly with each other. Furthermore, under the former case, E as an imposter knows K AB and thus communication content is decrypted by E with K AB . Under the latter case, though Eve can't acquires K AB (encrypted by E A ) to decrypt communication content later, he sends a great deal of dummy messages to consume available resources of B while hiding his genuine identity in the confidential communication phase, thus resulting in the DoS (Denial of Service) attack [17] .
Provable password-authenticated key exchange protocol
Above formalized analysis provides the direction for further improvement on protocol, in this section we propose a Provable Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PPAKE) protocol to overcome the vulnerabilities to imposter attack. As is shown in Fig. 4 , the proposed protocol operates as follow, where assuming that a secret password K pwd is pre-shared between A and B. (e.g. A hands her password to B face to face prior to group conference). E ,E , ,E are fully equal. If they are equal, the correctness of E A is verified, otherwise the network is suspected to suffer attack, so the IDS (Intrusion Detection System) is used to remove the attacker from the network (e.g. when B detects a malicious user using IDS, he adds the identity to his blacklist of no accessing network and informs other legal users to do so). After removing attacker, e.g. in the sessions posterior to the n th one with A, B collects the request message (e.g. ID with the true ID B she knows, if they match, he conforms that received K AB is transmitted by B. Subsequently A compares T B with the current clock T C , if T B equals to T C excluding transmission delay △ t, A believes K AB is fresh. N B is then encrypted with K AB and transmitted to B. Step4. After receiving the message from A, B decrypts it to obtain N B with E A and compares N B with its own one, if they match, B conforms that transmitted K AB has been received by A. 
Analysis of proposed protocol
Ban logic proving mutual authentication and immunity to external attack
In this section we formalize and analyze PPAKE protocol using models of BAN logic, the proposed protocol is proven to achieve the goals of mutual authentication and redundancy elimination, while at the same time being immune to the relay attack.
Firstly, the encrypted messages that avail us to analysis are formalized as follow according to BAN logic, particularly K AB is appended as a nonce value to the clear texts of M 3 for the convenience of logic deduction. Formalized analysis commences with M 1 . After B receives M 1 , formula (15) can be deduced by applying message-meaning rule to P 4, then formula (16) is yielded by applying freshness rule to P 9 , furthermore formula (17) is yielded by applying nonce-verification rule to formula (15) and formula (16) , and formula (18) is yielded by applying the fourth result of belief rule to formula (17) , finally formula (19) is yielded by applying jurisdiction rule to formula (18) 
After A receives the message M 2, formula (20) is yielded by applying the first result of belief rule is applied to P 1 and P 3 , and formula (21) is yielded by applying message-meaning rule to formula (20) , then formula (22) is yielded by applying freshness rule to P 8 , furthermore formula (23) is yielded by applying nonce-verification rule to formula (22) and formula (21) . Finally, the goal G 2 is achieved by applying the third result of belief rule to formula (23), and another goal G 1 is achieved by applying jurisdiction rule to G 2 under P 2. Based on above analysis, the proposed protocol achieves the same goals as EKE protocol, but it decreases the number of initial assumptions. 
The immunity to imposter attack from interior
Kerberos V5 [10] protocol and Shieh's [11] protocol rely on online TTP to authenticate two participating entities, but EKE protocol, Asokan's [2] protocol and our protocol enable mutual authentication independent of TTP, that means an improvement on security aspect. In comparison of the round number of message, the proposed protocol has the minimal number (without verification of public key), because it cuts the redundant processes. In addition, proposed protocol resists relay attack on session key, due to generate timestamps for revoking the out-of-dated session key. Certainly, protecting a password against offline dictionary attack is our protocol's merit, which is inherited from the basic EKE protocol. In table 3 we compare the computation times consumed by Chien's [12] protocol, Hwang's [13] and EKE protocol with that consumed by the proposed protocol while establishing session keys. The results show that Chien's protocol and Hwang's protocol have some computation times when initializing keying information such as initial global key, initial pairwise key and node ID, but the computation time of our protocol and EKE protocol [1] are little enough to be neglected because keying information is pre-distributed. When session key updates n times, the proposed protocol and EKE protocol require less computation times (without verification of public key) of asymmetric cryptography than that of Chien's, just require more than Hwang's. And the computation time of symmetric cryptography of our protocol is less than that of other protocol. Although the proposed protocol adopts asymmetric cryptography (e.g. RSA) whose computation time consumed is slower 150 times and 1500 times than those of symmetric cryptography and hash function [19, 20] , our protocol requires neither certificate authority (CA) nor hash function, whose computation time consumed can be neglected by comparing with Chien's and Hwang's protocol. Furthermore, in Fig. 6 we compare the computation cost incurred in Chien's, Hwang's and EKE protocol with that incurred in proposed protocol. The results shows that the total computation cost of the proposed protocol is less than that of other protocol when network communicates frequently (n>600), Therefore, our proposed PPAKE protocol is particularly useful in low-cost and dynamic topology wireless ad hoc networks. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we first discover that there exist some weaknesses in EKE protocol that is vulnerable to imposter attack based on the analysis result of BAN logic that we apply in EKE protocol, because the shared password is guessed the by attacker and previous session key is available in current session. Furthermore, in order to address the flaws we propose an improved scheme-Provable PasswordAuthenticated Key Exchange (PPAKE) protocol that generates the session key's timestamp, and verifies the authenticity of public key against imposter attack without online TTP. Moreover, the proposed protocol passes the authentication test using BAN logicality analysis. In comparison with other schemes, our proposed PPAKE protocol improves round and computation efficiencies suitable for wireless ad hoc networks.
